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 — by Neil E. Harl*
As a general rule, federal (and state) agricultural program
payments received as cash or in the form of services are
includible in income.1  The time at which the amounts are
received or made available is ordinarily the time the
payments are to be included in income.2  Amounts are
considered to be "made available" in the year in which
program requirements have been met, regardless of whether
an application had been signed to receive final payment.3
The fact that a farm operator does not sign the application
for final payment until the following year does not defer
income to the later year.4
Payments under a lease. In general, agricultural
program payments received under a crop share or livestock
share lease are reported into income and are considered to be
self-employment income if the landlord materially partici-
pates under the lease.5  Indeed, government payments are
handled as other farm income from the operation is treated.6
If other farm income is reportable as rent, and is not subject
to self-employment tax, neither are government payments
to be reported as self-employment income.  Likewise, if
other farm income is reported as earned income, so too
must government farm program payments be reported as
self-employment income.
A taxpayer receiving income from rents is subject to
self-employment tax if the operation constitutes a trade or
business.7  If an operation does not constitute a trade or
business, "rentals from real estate and from personal
property leased with the real estate" are excluded from net
earnings from self-employment tax.8
Conservation Program Payments.  As a multi-
year program of land diversion, the Conservation Reserve
Program (CRP) poses additional questions.
•  For a landowner who is not retired, who is materially
participating in the operation, and who does not retire
during the 10-year CRP land diversion period, CRP
payments are likely to be treated as self-employment
income.9
•  For a landowner who is retired at the time the land is
bid into the CRP program and who is not materially
participating, payments received  under  the  CRP  program
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should not be considered as net income from self-
employment.10  In a 1988 letter ruling in which the land
owner had terminated the lease several months before the
land was bid into the CRP program and thus no tenant was
involved, the landowner's activities under the CRP did not
constitute material participation.11
•  For landowners who retire after bidding the land into
the CRP program, the outcome is less clear.
Some authorities focus on the taxpayer's status at the
time the agreement was entered into.  This has been the
case with the 1987 dairy termination program12 and the
earlier soil bank program.13
Other authorities suggest that it is the taxpayer's status
at the time that payments are received that determines
liability for self-employment tax.14
The answer will not be known until the issue is
addressed by a ruling or a case.
FOOTNOTES
1 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-4.  See Baboquinari Cattle Co. v.
Comm'r, 47 B.T.A. 129 (1942), aff'd, 135 F.2d 114
(9th Cir. 1943); Harding v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
1970-179; Driscoll v. Comm'r, 3 T.C.M. 73 (1944),
aff'd and rev'd, 147 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1945); Graves v.
Comm'r, 88 T.C. 28 (1986), aff'd on reconsideration, 89
T.C. 49 (1987) (payments received under Water Bank
Program in exchange for set-aside of 770 acres
includible in gross income as rent).
2 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a).  See Rev. Rul. 65-95, 1965-1
C.B. 208; Rev. Rul. 67-404, 1967-2 C.B. 159 (farmer
required to include in gross  income for taxable year
1966 payments received in that year for both 1965 and
1966 crops; no basis for requesting permission to
change accounting treatment for these items).
3 Rev. Rul. 65-98,1965-1 C.B. 213 (advance and final
diversion payments made under 1963 Feed Grain
Program includible in gross income when received or
made available to taxpayer, whichever was earlier).
4 Id.
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5 See Maxwell v. Gardner, Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) ¶
14,533 (N.D. Ala. 1966).
6 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 60-32, 1960-1 C.B. 23 (payments
under Soil Bank Program includible as self-employment
income of owner operator).
7 Stevenson v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1989-357 (business
of leasing and selling portable advertising signs).
8 I.R.C. § 1402(b).
9 See Letter from Peter K. Scott, Associate Chief
Counsel, Technical, Internal Revenue Service, March
10, 1987.
1 0 Ltr. Rul. 8822064, March 7, 1988.
1 1 Id.
1 2 Notice 87-26, 1987-1 C.B. 470.
1 3 Rev. Rul. 60-32, 1960-1 C.B. 23.
1 4Soc. Sec. Rul. 67-42 (cropland adjustment program).    
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
ESTATE PROPERTY.  Prior to bankruptcy, the
debtors transferred their residence to a trust for the benefit of
the debtors.  The trust instrument provided that the trustee
had the power to sell the property only with the permission
of the debtors and contained spendthrift trust provisions.
The remainder of the trust was to pass to the debtors' issue.
The court held that the trust was not a valid spendthrift trust
and was included in estate property.  The court also held that
the debtors' children owned no interest in the trust because
the entire beneficial interest belonged to the debtors and the
debtors retained control over sale of the trust property.  In
re  Frangos, 132 B.R. 723 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1991) .
EXEMPTIONS.
HOMESTEAD.  Four months prior to filing bankruptcy
the debtor moved out of the residence because judgment
creditors told the debtor that the house would be sold.  The
debtor claimed the house as exempt and stated that she would
move back into the house and repair it if the exemption was
allowed.  The court held that N.M. Stat. § 42-10-9 did not
require physical possession as of the date of the bankruptcy
petition where the only reason the debtor did not occupy the
residence was because creditors told the debtor she would lose
the house.  In re  Wells, 132 B.R. 966 (Bankr. D .
N.M. 1991).
PENSION PLAN.  The debtor claimed an exemption in
an ERISA qualified pension plan established by the debtor's
corporation.  The court held that the plan was not excluded
from the bankruptcy estate under ERISA as a nonbankruptcy
law exemption but was exempt under Fla. Stat. § 222.21,
which was not pre-empted by ERISA.  The court also held
that the Florida exemption was not unconstitutional in that
Fla. Const. Art. 10, § 4(a)(2) did not limit the value of
exemptions for personal property.  In re  Rosenbloom,
132 B.R. 970 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991).
The debtor claimed an exemption in an ERISA qualified
pension plan.  The court held that the plan was exempt under
Fla. Stat. § 222.21, which was not pre-empted by ERISA.
In re  Gurvish, 132 B.R. 976 (Bankr. S.D. F la .
1990) .
The debtor claimed an exemption in an ERISA qualified
pension plan.  The court held that the plan was not excluded
from the bankruptcy estate under ERISA as a nonbankruptcy
law exemption and was not exempt under Ariz. Rev. Stat. §
33-1126, which was pre-empted by ERISA.  Pitrat v .
Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1991).
STEREO.  The debtor claimed an exemption for a $600
built-in stereo using the $200 exemption for household
goods plus $400 of the wildcard exemption resulting from
the unused homestead exemption under Ga. Code § 44-13-
100(a)(6).  The court held that the exemption was allowed
because the wildcard exemption could be applied to property
partially exempt under other exemption provisions.  Matter
of McGuire, 132 B.R. 803 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
1987), aff'd , 132 B.R. 807 (M.D. Ga. 1989).
INVOLUNTARY PETITION. Involuntary petitions
were filed against the debtors who argued that the petitions
were improper because the loans held by the filing parties
were subject to bona fide disputes.  The court followed
precedent in the Seventh and Tenth Circuits as to the
standard used to determine whether a bona fide dispute exists
as "an objective basis for either a factual or legal dispute as
to the validity of the debt."  The court held that the trial
court could examine the legal and factual issues involved in
the dispute for the purpose of the determination.  The
creditors had the initial burden to show that no dispute
existed and then the burden shifted to the debtors to show the
existence of a dispute.  The court held that the creditors met
their burden in showing that the loans' terms, payment
amounts and effect of guarantees were not in dispute by the
parties.  The court also held that the debtors failed to
demonstrate the existence of an oral agreement to alter the
terms of the loans; thus, no bona fide dispute as to the loans
was found.  In re  Rimel, 946 F.2d 1363 (8th Cir .
1991), aff'g , 121 B.R. 253 (E.D. Mo. 1990) ,
aff'g , 111 B.R. 250 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990).
SALE OF ESTATE PROPERTY.  The Chapter 11
debtor entered into a stipulated agreement with creditors to
purchase anhydrous ammonia stored in the debtor's tanks and
subject to competing security interests.  The stipulation
stated the price as $123.12 per metric ton.  One of the
creditors sought modification of the agreement to set the
price at $123.12 per short ton.  The creditor argued that parol
evidence of the amended price should be allowed to prove the
intended price and that the agreement should be amended
because of mistake.  The court held that parol evidence was
not allowed because the agreement contained no
inconsistencies or ambiguities as to the price and that
amendment for mistake would not be allowed because only
the creditor claimed a mistake was made.  In re  Royster
Co., 132 B.R. 684 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1991).
